Lauren Bedula
00:06
Welcome back to building the base. Lauren Bedula and Hondo Geurts here with today's guest, Admiral Mike Moran. We're really excited to have Mike on today's show because he spent a lot of time within the Navy, working with different PEOs, very focused on the acquisition processes and looking for ways to innovate, so something we care quite a bit about, and are excited to dig in today. So, Mike, thanks so much for joining us.
Hondo Geurts
00:34
So, Mike, you and I have had the pleasure of serving together for a long time and working against the bureaucracy and trying to reinvent things. But let's step back a little bit further, and many of our listeners may or may not know Mike comes from a military family. His brother also served for a long time. But what got you into the Navy, what got you kind of started? And then how did you think about going from an operational career into this weird world of military acquisition?
Admiral Mike Moran
01:08
Yeah, so you know my fame and my parents weren't military, but my dad was very much pro military. We grew up in New York, just outside of West Point, actually. So, my dad was very excited about getting us to go to West Point, believe it or not, but we spent enough time there to know that probably wasn't in it for my brother and I. So, we kind of tricked us and visiting the Naval Academy, which a little bit different than West Point, and we kind of fell in love. So that got us started, and the Navy. And honestly, I didn't have long term plans to stay in the Navy for a long career, but I selected aviation once I graduated and flew the p3 Orion for several tours. And I just, I just love the mission. I love the people. It was towards the end of the Cold War that we flew, and I, like a lot of people, don't know we flew 24/7 365, we stood ready on the east coast because the Russian submarines were off the Atlantic seaboard.
Hondo Geurts
02:18
So, remind people what a p3 does or did back then.
Admiral Mike Moran
02:21
P3 is a big orange and turboprop that hunts submarines, mostly back in the day. Now it does ISR and overland stuff during the Gulf War, but primarily in ASW and I submarine warfare aircraft. So, we hunted Russian submarines, and there were plentiful back in the late 80s. And I want to date myself, but when we did it, and so I loved it. From a national security perspective, there's nothing more important than knowing where the Russian submarines were because of the threat they presented to the US so deployed around the world. And mostly I just love the people and their mission. So it kept me in and in one of those tours, actually my first tour towards the end, I had about six months left, and my first tour before I was going off to be an instructor back then, which it doesn't exist today, we actually had advanced development organization in each of the wings so we would, you know, bring new capability onto the aircraft at the wing level, which today is unfortunately unheard of. So, I they put me over there for six months, which really got me started in the acquisition technology side of the house. And it was exciting. We put, you know, we had the first apps 137 radar, which was a synthetic inverse synthetic radar, which we could actually use a radar to see ships at a distance from a picture. I mean, the first time we did that, that was really exciting. And so, you could extend the targeting range from a p3 really quite far, which was very different than what we've ever done before. But my favorite story of that was back then, we put a new acoustic processor. So, we would, we would use sound to track, find summaries. We dropped snobs in the water, which are just big microphones, and listen for the sound of a submarine. And so, this, this small company, developed an acoustic processor with a memory. I say that because back then, we didn't have memories on our on our airplane color displays, and so you could repeat and see color, because you could break out the signatures and easily, more easily, see it. And we put that on the airplane, and we took it and did some trials with, and it worked great, and it was better than what anybody else had, and we were all excited about it. I'm like, wow, let's transition this. Let's get this on our airplanes, because it's better because we had it side by side. We could tell I could always find a server with that first than what we had on the airplane. But I got to tell you, that was on the airplane, one airplane we did that for about, about. Six to eight months, I guess then he took it off, because those requirements are now being written for that kind of capability. So, we didn't want to have that company have an unfair advantage, apparently. So, there was going to be a competition. We wrote the competition, I will tell you, I came back into the into the p3 community after two more tours. So, three for about six years later, we still did not have that capability on the airplane. Wow. And it didn't show up for another two years after that. And you just look in the mirror and you go, how is this possible? That technology was available. It worked. We just hooked it up to the same sensors we had an airplane then, but to go through the process of selecting, and that company didn't get selected, by the way, I don't need to talk about who it was, and a new company, which was not as good, and the fleet, the Navy, didn't realize that capability for another eight to nine years for something that simple that was already available. So that got me started. There has to be a better way to do this. And you know, unfortunately, you know, probably four or five years later, the Navy, for whatever reason today, we're not going to do these, these capability organizations at the wing level. We're going to move all that back on the aviation side, back to NAVAIR. We want NAVAIR to control that stuff. We want to control what's going to the airplane. And so, some of the innovation and technology that was happening at a rapid pace really started to go away. And was a shame, because it's a really great opportunity to explore and experiment and see what works and what doesn't.
Hondo Geurts
06:41
So fast forward, and then, as we're replacing a p3 then you transition into the acquisition community to lead that transition of a whole new airplane and platform.
Admiral Mike Moran
06:53
Yeah, that was, that was an honor, right? I mean, so flew p3 for 20 years, and you replace an airplane, a weapon system. It's a once in a lifetime opportunity, right? You replace it. The p3 came into service in the 60s, right? And so, 50 years later, you're replacing it with a pH so I had a really, really good fortune of being asked to participate in that. So, I worked the pH program as a deputy and then the program manager for eight years, basically. So that was a lot of fun. We could talk about that process of a major program, bringing that through the system, but pretty proud that they a lot of, lot of good folks that set it up right, but executed it. We, you know, delivered that that airplane on time, on schedule and on cost, and it's serving today, doing, doing really well, and the fleet really, really likes that. But going back to Navarre, that was kind of my transition phase, because I did some acquisition tours in between my operational tours, because of that first stint up in Brunswick Maine, my first squadron tour, doing the innovation sell. So, you know, one of the things that we can talk about that tied to hertz and I together a little before I went to work for him, I became a PEO after a couple different tours. A PEO is a program executive officer. So, oversaw 11 programs on the Navy side, all of the Tactical Aviation kind
Hondo Geurts
08:20
of a kind of a PNL leader, if equivalent, if you were to think of a incorporate terms, right? So
Admiral Mike Moran
08:27
all of the programs associated with naval aviation on aircraft carrier or other ships. So, you know, the F eighteens, the e2 weapons, sensors, anything that was really on the on the tactical side. So, for p3 guy, that was somewhat unique, but acquisitions, acquisition, if you know how to go do the business, but, but one of the things I wanted to do is go back to my first how do we deliver capability that matters? Yeah. So, one of the first trips I wanted to understand was, what does the CO comms need in the Pacific. So, Admiral Harris, who was the COCOM out in Westpac, into, Pacific, he was a Petri guy, so I knew him a little bit. So, I went out and talked to the science advisor, and I got an hour with Admiral Harris, and I asked him, What do you need? So, what's your biggest challenge that I can help you with? And I'll tell you, his answer was, Well, Mike, I'd love to get your help, but I'm not sure you acquisition guys can help me, because I only got a year left, and seems to me it takes you guys about eight to nine years to deliver anything. I said, Well, depends on what it is, sir, but let me see if I can help you. So, he took me into a room with his son's advisor and a couple other folks, and said, Here's my biggest problem, which I can't tell you on this podcast. I said, Okay, I will do my best to bring you a solution before you leave within a year. He's like, Okay, that would be awesome, but I won't hold my breath. So, I went back and I took two, oh, sixes of. Who were not program managers yet, but aspiring program managers like what in my room? I said, here's the problem. I got them read in especially, and I need a solution. And 11 months deliver, not, you know, delivered, not experimented, delivered, delivered to the fleet that's usable. So, these two guys came back, and I said, you have two weeks to come back with a plan. They came back, these two guys, and they said, Sir, here's the plan. And four years, we can deliver these four things. Three will be earned packs. One will they said, What didn't you understand about 11 months, four years? And I said, Okay, you're done. I need two more. So, I got two more. Oh, sixes, who are now very successful. PMS, one just finished. The other one's about to finish, by the way. And I said, here's the challenge. You guys now have 10 months. Here's the problem. Those guys, long story short, figured it out. Wow, they went and got a tech what ties us together? Before I knew Secretary Geurts was he developed some technology down in SOCOM, a center package for other things that was developed. So, we went out with a BAA. People say you can't do things fast in acquisition, right?
Hondo Geurts
11:16
So, we went out with the BAA, broad area announcement, right?
Admiral Mike Moran
11:19
Just say who had this kind of technology available, and we got papers back in 30 days, we made a selection. So, there's your competition. They came in and because they wanted to play at a very affordable price, then we went to the fleet, and we found a test pilot. It was a CEO of a squadron, a growler Squadron, I guess I can say that. He says, I want to do this and partner with you guys. So, we did all of the work on actual fleet airplane in Whidbey Island. And long story short, between industry, a couple small companies and a larger company, and NAVAIR and these two program managers, they delivered a capability to Admiral Harris before he left. Wow. And it's still working today, and it's growing and maturing that capability so it can be done right with the right leadership and motivation and drive.
Lauren Bedula
12:14
That's awesome. So, a couple of quick reactions. One, it's interesting to hear your family story, and amazing to see how you and your brother served for so long after that, I would have thought you would have had a long line of service in your family. So, it's cool, and especially coming from the West Point area. So great to hear that. And then, too, something that stands out to me about that story is we often treat this problem as a today problem, and it sounds to me like this is a decades old problem, and I'm sitting here with two great acquisition leaders. So, want to dig into that a little bit, because we do talk about often on our show and in these communities that are looking at innovation around acquisition processes that it's not necessarily authorities or policies that are needed to change, and in your most recent story reflects that it's kind of culture and comes down to people teams. So, my question there is more. Can you talk about the changes over these decades as it relates to unlocking authorities and policies, or does anything stand out to you as a real enabler to get to just this? Not simple but focus on culture instead.
Admiral Mike Moran
13:22
Yeah, you know, once again, I go back and when, when sick Dicker took over. He had an all-PEO meeting, and I was a PO at the time, so the primary executive officer from, from all of the Navy all got together. And I'll never forget, you know, he asked, What's some of the big challenge? He wanted to know. And I said, and this, I don't know if you remember this, I said, Oh, sir, here's my problem. I was the lead engineer for the p3 community called the class des o4 as the lead engineer
Hondo Geurts
13:52
for so oh four for the nonmilitary is probably in servers, 10 year, 15 years, maybe, yeah, 1012, years, Yep, yeah.
Admiral Mike Moran
13:59
So fairly Junior, but I was still the lead engineer at Navier, with a civilian counterpart who was a trained engineer, although I was an engineer by at the Naval Academy. But then I had contract authority as a 34 year old, you know, oh, four. So I could write a letter contract to industry if I saw, if the fleet came in with a problem on the airplane, we didn't know what it was, I could write a letter contract and have that industry partner engaged within an hour. Wow, right? And I had, I had a budget, I had money. I had, you know, I had to track it right, so it wasn't, wasn't ended, but I'd be smart about it. That all went away. I had more authority as an old four at 34, years old than I did that day as a PEO after,
Hondo Geurts
14:55
you know, 28 years, two star Navy, after two years. Two star
Admiral Mike Moran
15:00
Navy, I had more authority to go get things done. Everything was a mother, may I? So it's not just about people and culture. It's alignment with the right resources and the motivation to drive that kind of outcome. If that makes sense,
Lauren Bedula
15:16
it does. And actually, if I can ask a question about that, the motivation piece, because when we talk about culture, I think folks often think it's just almost the energy to solve hard problems. You want to get folks excited, like you were to do something within a year. But there's also risk associated with that too, making decisions that are outside the box, or using a BAA and strict rules to follow. Could you react just to this idea of like, how to weigh risk with incentive in the acquisition world?
Admiral Mike Moran
15:48
Yeah, I think that's the most important job of a program manager. I think is put in that position because your balance. And I always do this when I review programs where I work, Secretary Geurts, I always look at the risk and opportunity charts, right besides the schedule. And I want to know, does the program manager and his or her team understand the risks and their opportunities, and are they balanced? Right? Because it's very easy culturally to be risk averse. So engineers tend to be risk averse, and they don't want to take a risk. They want more tests. I want more data. So what is that right amount? As a program manager, you have to move that needle or no one else will. If you sit back passively as a program manager and go, okay, the engineer says, I need 20 tests. And you say, okay, 20 tests. Well, now that's a year, but only have six months. Well, you've got to sit back and go, Why do I need? Yeah, that much testing. Explain to me, let's go talk through this and just constantly, constantly balance that. And if you're not doing that, I tell program managers I talked to, we just talked about on the drive over. If you're not trying to find schedule and cost savings every day, you're a program manager, you're not doing your job right, because you're going to find things that you didn't intend to find, that are going to cost money and schedule. So if you're not finding those up because they're searching for them every day in your program, then you're going to be behind the eight ball because something's going to come up to surprise you. And if you have to go back and ask somebody for money or time every time something like that happens, you lose if you can, if you can solve 50% 60% of those yourself, then you're in a much better place to move your program forward. So you have to balance that. No one will do it for you, but I see too many people being passive. Hey, the engineering team or the test team said I need x and so I just need x and y. You've got to be able to challenge that, I mean, intelligently and balance that. You know, there is a path.
Lauren Bedula
17:48
Is there good connectivity with the end user to see the reward of that good work? Or I'm trying to think of it's too easy to be passive. What got you so excited about Admiral Harris's problem because
Admiral Mike Moran
18:02
of the significance of the problem. Yeah, okay, right, the reality of what he was facing, right? And two things that really hit me, one is, we should be able to help that problem, right? It's not instrument. It's not a technology problem. We should be able to solve it right. The other thing that hurt my head was his. He wasn't dismissive, but his frustration that the community itself of acquisition couldn't respond. And here's your four star, one of the most senior leaders in all of DOD. And that was his perspective. Wow, right? And that that should not be the case. We acquisition be there to support the warfighter and every case possible, and it's you're able to do it right. You got to align people right, culturally, the right resources, right, and then balance the risks and opportunities to go deliver that because it's doable.
Hondo Geurts
18:59
Yeah. So Mike, you know, one of the things I admired when we were teammates, and I think applies, and whether it's in government or in large institutions, which you've now seen since you've got out, is how do you create relationships outside your own specific discipline? And I think one of the challenges to folks who don't understand the acquisition process is they kind of believe the program manager has complete authority to do everything he or she wants to do, and they're timid or their risk averse. They don't understand the ecosystem. And you know the 1000s of stakeholders that all think they can say they can't say yes, but they can sure say no. How did you approach working across and outside your specific discipline when you were for those listeners, that Mike was when I was the secretary, he was the senior military Acquisition Officer for the Navy and Marine Corps. I. Did you approach that? Where did you see that value, and how has that shaped how you think about driving strategic change outside government, in whatever you're working on now,
Admiral Mike Moran
20:12
Yea education. And I say that because just in some of the problems industry I was working with and made fronts try to solve a problem, but they don't understand really the problem they're trying to solve, because it's a big ecosystem, right? It's, that's not acquisition policy. It's so easy to point fingers. I think, you know, defense, Acquisition University has a, you know, a little frame where they here's, here's all the policies from the 70s. It's the size of a golf ball. Here's all the policies today, it's the size of a softball, right? Nothing comes away. We just add, add, add. And so I tell people, there's enough policy and acquisition to do what you want. It's ridiculous to say you're limited, but there are real statutory limitations from the Hill that guide you in competitions and contracts that are, you know, you have to execute to. So a lot of people who were not ex, you know, experienced or have the background in and the full acquisition understand that piece of it. So there are some frustrations. Why do I have to compete? I like I like that. I want that box. Well, you can't have that box, but here's how we can go after that capability faster, if we can get that conversation better, but people, so I want that. I want that specific box from that company. And you know, there's rules, laws against that. And so I think you had to educate people. So I think I like to draw out the ecosystem where everybody's role is the ecosystem. And just try to say, here's where you sit in this system, and here's how you can help and how we can help each other. But remember, you're part of it. Instead of pointing the finger at each other, which we're very good at, you're terrible at your job. Here's how we can work together, if we all understand. So I will tell you, you know, I we talked about it a couple months ago, drawing out the ecosystem of sustainment. For instance, how do you sustain a weapon system? I almost guarantee you less than, less than 1% of people in acquisition or in the service really understand the full ecosystem, how it works. So if I want to invest in some software or some tools, does that really matter? I don't know. Does it affect the end product or not? So you got to understand the full ecosystem. So education and making people see where their role is, understanding how it affects all the other pieces of it.
Lauren Bedula
22:36
It really does. And maybe this is a question for both of you, because, Hondo, I know you care quite a bit about the acquis or the education piece. And so Mike, what I'm hearing you say is there are tons of pathways. It's just awareness of those pathways through education which is important. So any quick ideas about resources, because I know we have listeners in PEOs trying to disrupt culture, but any quick takes on where to access, kind of those educational resources.
Admiral Mike Moran
23:05
Yeah? I mean, I think, I think there's, there's, there's courses that the Navy has, the other services have, DAU has some pieces. But I would say, reach out. Reach out to those experiences. We don't do it enough. Yeah, and I was just talking actually Admiral chubby down at NAVAIR. Because just a quick story about education, one of the things that I found frustrating and just enlightening to me. So when we did the p8 program, so it was a 737, designed airplane modified to run the p8 ASW ISR mission set, so really significantly modified 737, put up Bombay and some other pressure bulkheads in the bottom of an airplane for EIR pieces and some other things. So it's a difficult was a difficult design, but we had a preliminary design review of the Navy. And I tell this story because it's important. This review, it's pretty important. And take three months to get ready for this thing. And you have, we probably had 500 people from industry, Boeing at the time, from the NAVAIR, from the fleet. Everybody comes in and you spend a week going through the design, the requirements, are you good and not? And for the first time, I was aware that anybody could remember, we had a perfect PDR, which means we had no actions, no, no, no. You know. RFIs requests for information, nothing. Everyone's like, this perfect. It's perfect. I'm like, What a great program. But we took three months off to get ready for this thing. I came back that was a Friday. We all celebrated, flew back to the pact river on a Monday, went back and go, Oh my gosh, we're overweight. We got power issues. We got design issues. How does that happen? Well, we took three months. Convince everybody we were a good stead. But the point is, we were talking about process. Two weeks later, Boeing had a non advocate review with senior, retired folks from Boeing, who from the commercial side. So their commercial review of the airplane, they redesigned the airplane in three days. Wow, because they said that where you're putting the bomb bay, and somebody said bulkhead, you're the load paths are going to be at risk on the empennage and tail connection. So we need to redesign, we need to re strengthen it. And I'm like, Oh my gosh, how is this possible? That we did a week with all these technical experts, and we missed some of the most basic designs because we didn't have the right people, right and so I think there's and my point of the Admiral check, I said, Do you have a gray beard panel of folks like I Secretary Kurtz on call for some of these new program managers? Because if you my case, when's the last time a major program came through? Not often for the p3 community or NPR community 50 years so how many program owners have that experience? How many people at Navier and the gym have that experience? So you need to build that kind of core expertise,
Hondo Geurts
26:08
yeah, and so I, I hear network, right? Yeah, getting, getting and closing the dishes all the way to your first story. How do you close that cultural, organizational, technical distance between an end user and acquire and all and the developer, whoever that is. But I also think there's closing distance, and many folks don't appreciate, you know, to create capability takes a user. It takes somebody to write the requirements. It takes somebody to find the money, and then it takes somebody to somebody to go develop the program. What is your sense, both on a government side, but even if you're an industry, the value of getting out of your swim lane and interacting with all those different pieces so you turn transactional handover processes into a more collaborative approach.
Admiral Mike Moran
27:04
Yeah. Well, I think it goes back to, you know, everyone has a swim lane. If you're really good at your swim lane, I go back to, you know, F 18 readiness, back in the day when Secretary Spencer said, unacceptable. I don't you know General Mattis when he was the SEC def said, it's unacceptable. So fix it, and you started take a look at yourself. But back in those days, the supply system was green, right? The acquisition program manager guys were green. DLA was green. The FRCS were green. So everybody in their swim lane was green, but the fleet was this bright red, right? You're less than 45% available mission capable airplanes. How can that be right? Because we weren't working together and understanding each other's swim lane. So you have to, you have to go do that. You have to have the right incentives cross swim lanes to drive people to be collaborative and work together for the right outcome. I think we get lost, and I can quickly tell you what my problem is. So I'm going to put some money against it and go fix my problem. But that may not fix the end product. That goes back to education, understanding the ecosystem and the investment you're making. Will it really change an outcome that matters for the fleet, right the end user? So,
Hondo Geurts
28:17
so for those startups out there, or folks wanting to get into, you know, helping national security, there is the need for a little humility to understand the ecosystem you're playing in before pitching a solution. If you don't yet quite understand the problem from these various perspectives is, are there ways companies should be thinking about that if they want to. You know, help sustainment, again, some complex systems. So you don't want to make it appear that there's nothing that can be done for them. But I do think many companies don't take time to understand the problem versus they have a product, they're just trying to sell a product or a piece of technology. Any recommendations you'd have for folks who want to, you know, try and help solve problems? Yeah, well, I
Admiral Mike Moran
29:06
think that, you know, one understanding the environment you're going to put that technology in. I mean, I think that's one of the biggest problems we face. I mean, the commercial tech doesn't take into account the environment we actually operate in. In some cases, if you're operating over aircraft carrier, you're going to shoot, you know, launch and recover off an aircraft carrier. There's a lot of stress that gets put on the systems, right? And then the environment you're flying in, the temperature, the conditions, do you understand all of those things. So getting smart on that, getting the right people engaged to understand it from the very get go, are the things you need to do. I mean, one of the things, I think this is just my personal opinion. You know, we went to cots, guts his commercial off the shelf. We're gonna go, cos gonna say, you know, we have these supercomputers now. We'll just put them on airplanes, and we're gonna be all well and good, and we'll replace that every year, like technology does out in the. The commercial world would be great, but we never resourced cots. So and pH is a great example, right? So you design p8 back in 2003 2004 you know, initial design, you get through the design Aries, like I said, then you start delivering airplanes in 2009 2010 Well, guess what? Those computer chips that's not made anymore. So one of my biggest problems, actually, going back to rescheduling, was I needed money to replace, and, you know, upgrade those components. And I was like, well, like, it's a new airplane. I said, No, it's, it's nine years old, right? They don't make those chips anymore, so now you have to get a new chip. Then you got to certify it, validate it in the right environment, and the airplane make sure it doesn't make any negative impacts the rest of the airplane. So we never have really put the resourcing to balance the COTS investment versus the outcome and value of it right, because there are continuous upgrades to it. And as you know, those chips, I mean the commercial vendor, if there's no commercial need for that, and we're just a small piece of that pie, they're not going to make them anymore. So who's watching that? How are you tracking that? And then what's the process to make sure you can have the resources to upgrade that? That is a significant problem in today's environment, with airplanes as or any weapon system as we fuel them and maintain them.
Lauren Bedula
31:20
That's a great point. And it's interesting to see even the software companies that are looking at trying to manage those supply chains or opportunities there, and speaking of disruptive tech and industry, those looking to break in to DOD as partners and providers, I think over the past decade or so, maybe especially the past five years, there's been a lot of emphasis on innovation hubs, so doors to knock on. There are, by some counts, over 100 in DOD, which is great, because that access, having the opportunity to have those conversations is important to understand the problem sets and environments like you talked about, but now I'm seeing a lot of focus on No, no, it's the PEOs. We've got to get to the programs of record. We don't want sabers, we don't want pilots or prototypes. We really want to get to those longer term opportunities, which makes a lot of sense from a business perspective. But how realistic is that if a program of record is established, can you add new entrants fairly easily? Or how much flexibility is there in PEOs? Well,
Admiral Mike Moran
32:26
there's a bit, a couple great articles recently on that. And you know, the, know, the transition of those technologies in a program's record is, is notoriously difficult, right? Because the budgets are spoken for. There's not excess dollars for those things. And even the sippers, you got into a phase three and at least, at least in the last 10 years, you have to have a transition into the services budget to get to that level. But those are few and far between. But
Lauren Bedula
32:52
how about for established programs of record? Are you able to add new capabilities?
Admiral Mike Moran
32:57
You are I think, I think you got to balance. And I think, and it was what just me, it was those of us who work the PA program. Number of the my predecessors as follows, we were very strict on what requirements we changed, because I think that's another problem we have. If you don't understand the environment, if I want to add a new requirement to x, it's just not simple, right? Because now there's design changes, there's support changes, there's a whole slew of change that come with that that are cost and schedule, risk. Do you understand those? And I think you got to be really cautious, right of how you manage those changes. And the one things we did on PA, we just, we, we really refrain from making a significant requirements change. I think that was part of our success story. And there was plenty of people who came out, not just on the fleet side, but plenty of folks came out. Oh, it'd be great if the airplane could do this like, Nope. That is not a KPP, a key performance parameter. When you really evaluate that's not what we're building this airplane for. That will be an increment to follow. Let's get it on the list. We will consider that. That's why I think the open systems architecture and some of the things are really, really important, I mean, and I say that because Mosa open system architecture requirements were part of PA but they weren't really well defined back then. So understanding the standards, really government standards and interfaces we're getting much better at that will help drive some of the engagement of technology. We'd be able to share that with some of these small tech houses that will enable us to be more able to quickly inject capabilities that are so but we have to get that design architecture right up front. Some of the older platforms, it's a little more difficult, because architecture doesn't enable that as easily. So getting the architecture right in the beginning for these current programs really important. Sharing that with anybody so they can know how to interface their tech. And then some of the older platforms, we've got to get the data available so they. Do that.
Hondo Geurts
35:00
So I think a couple interesting lessons learned out there, both, I think, on the industry side and on the government program manager side. And it goes back to this idea, I think, of network and getting outside your zone of comfort to understand who the real performers are. It could be the person who did the last time. It could be 10 people who haven't in the past, or if you're a performer or you want to help understanding what's going on, but, but I do believe the Program Executive Officers and program manager play a critical role in that, because it's hard if you're a requirements officer to understand what's in the art of the possible. Technology wise, and it all does kind of come together at that program manager PEO level, if the technology will get there, what's your sense? Mike on where we have opportunities to bring in new technologies, even if it's, you know, we often think of new capabilities, but we have a lot of established, you know, big costs and sustainment. You know, when we were working together, you were looking at all the logistics IT systems. Where do you see opportunities for new technologies to help us do some of the basic roles and missions, whether it's training or maintenance or supply? Where's your untapped areas for disruption?
Admiral Mike Moran
36:24
Yeah, so you know, two things you said. One is, I want to make there's enough resources out there. There are. And I think on the on the R and D tech front, I think we have too many people out playing. And one of the things that, you know, I talked when I when I left, and secrets and I had this conversation many times, we get stuck in this requirement resource conversation. And I always try to tell people, pull it back to what's the capability you need? Let's talk about capability gaps, and then let's technology come in and offer how to best fill that. We get wedded way too early. I have this requirement. And sometimes the requirements based on a capability or a system, what somebody sees in industry makes, well, I need that. That's the requirement I have so, well, no, that's not the requirement. What's the capability you need to go execute the warfighter scenario you need to execute too, so we don't get our technology guys in early enough to evaluate what are the capability gaps that we can affordably implement to help solve the warfighter problem. So I think we got to do a better job of that right. And so realignment of how we assess capability versus requirements and resources really important to get go on the sustainment front. We got to understand the weapon system, right? I mean, I think Secretary Geurts, we looked at it, we did an assessment, I don't, four years ago, of the this may make your head hurt, by the way, so it systems that support sustainment within the Navy, so ships, submarines and airplanes, all the IT systems we use to track sustainment. We had over 342 IT systems for the United States Navy that were being used or leveraged in some way, shape or form, to manage sustainment or provide data. And the problem we had was, which one is correct, which is right, but each party or component within the ship world or the submarine or aviation world used one of those and they didn't want to give it up. And so not only are we paying for each one of those to maintain them and upgrade them, they're not really giving us an outcome that's usable, because in many cases, they weren't given the same data. So getting accurate data that's actionable, that can drive supply chain to our suppliers. Because, you know, we can talk about resources and a second on the sustainment side, but if we don't have accurate data that could lead turn suppliers, we're never going to get it right. We're never going to get it right, and I think that's part of the problem we have today. Just don't have accurate data of what's driving readiness across our fleet so we can make the right investments for our supply chain, to make them, allow them to make the right long term investments to help us.
Lauren Bedula
39:24
That's great, great awareness into your point earlier, just about the education piece, what we hope to do on our show is just create awareness of the systems, the processes, how difficult it is. And I think the ACT acquisition world can be a bit of a an unknown for many So Mike, thank you so much for coming on today to talk about that and best practices that you've seen and sharing, sharing that awareness and to your point to our listeners, just leverage your network if you don't know, ask. And Admiral Moran, thank you so much for coming on today.
Admiral Mike Moran 29: 26
I enjoyed it, cool...bye